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Richard Richards, Robert Roberts, and Aristotelian
Aristotelianism
Steve Gimbel
This paper is a tribute to a philosopher and
a person I have long admired, Richard C. Richards.
As a clear and rigorous thinker, a thoughtful and
accessible writer, and as a kind, blunt, and extremely
funny person, Richard embodies virtues I hope to
someday claim as well.
It is, I believe, fitting, to begin this tribute to
Richard by considering the philosophical work of
someone else entirely. Richard has a well-developed
sense of humor, something he defines as the
attitude to properly appreciate incongruities, and
the idea of honoring one person by discussing the
work of another is surely the sort of incongruity he
has the attitude to appreciate.
The other philosopher I want to begin
discussing in order to honor Richard C. Richards is
another prominent name in the philosophy of
humor, Robert C. Roberts. Roberts is emeritus from
Wheaton College, that is, the Wheaton College in
Illinois, not the Wheaton College in Massachusetts.
(I want to be perfectly clear that we are talking
about Robert Roberts from Wheaton, not Robert
Roberts from Wheaton.) Richard Richards and
Robert Roberts, we will see, are similar in that the
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accounts of humor they give come from a
commitment to an Aristotelian foundation.
Robert Roberts is quite explicit about this in
his article “Humor and the Virtues.” In this piece,
Robert Roberts, like Richard Richards, begins by
adopting an incongruity account of humor. For both
Robert Roberts and Richard Richards, an act is
humorous only if it includes an incongruity that is at
least perceived by the person finding the act
humorous (more than perception may be required,
but the perception of the incongruity is at least a
necessary condition for an act to be an act of
humor).
Robert Roberts, like Richard Richards, is not
interested in humor theory for the sake of humor
theory, but hopes to find how we ought to think
about humor as embedded in the lived life.
The key to perceiving incongruities for the
sake of humor, according to Robert Roberts, is
“perspectivity.” When we see something as
incongruous, what we are often doing is seeing the
same thing from multiple perspectives. By seeing
the same thing through different interpretive lenses,
we can make sense of the same thing in different,
perhaps contrasting, ways.
This perspectivity, he argues, requires
dissociation, that is, (a) the ability for us to recognize
that there is a perspective other than our own to be
occupied, and (b) the ability to then occupy this
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alternative perspective. To develop a sense of
humor, that is, to be able to recognize humor, one
needs to always be aware that one is perceiving
through a perspective which is not the only possible
perspective.
He does not, however, contend that all is
mere perspective. He is committed to the existence
of an objective reality. So, we must not attribute to
Robert Roberts a perspectival perspectivalism, but
rather a more limited perspectivalism which he
terms “soft perspectivalism.” There is a real world,
he holds, but we experience it from one of many
possible angles.
Humor is to found in simultaneously
understanding: (1) the perception of the object of
the perception from our perspective, (2) that there is
another perspective from which the object of
perception may be perceived, (3) the perception of
the object of perception from the alternative
perspective, and (4) that there is an incongruity
between the two perceptions despite the fact that
they are perceptions of the same object being
perceived. Sometimes, but only sometimes, this
incongruity will be of the proper sort to be
humorous. A sense of humor is the ability to
distinguish the proper from the improper cases.
The question he ultimately seeks to answer
in setting this out is whether a sense of humor ought
to be considered a virtue, or at least something
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capable of enhancing one’s moral education which
he works out in terms of character development
which in turn is worked out in terms of virtues. This
is where the Aristotelianism is fully transparent.
This gets ramped up further with Robert
Roberts’ contention that each person possesses both
a character and a nature and that virtue is the state
of one’s character being brought into line with one’s
nature. To recognize that there is a gap between
one’s character and one’s nature is to see oneself in
two different ways as being two different things.
This is an incongruity and can, through proper
dissociation and perspectivity, allow one to laugh at
one’s own flaws and foibles. This, then, puts us in a
place of objective knowledge about what we need to
improve in ourselves and that is crucial to personal
growth. In Robert Roberts’ own words,
“The concept of a virtue implies the concept
of a human nature. To possess a virtue is to
be ‘qualified’ as having to that extent
realized one’s nature, as having become in
actuality what one inevitably was in
potentiality. The concept of a virtue is thus
the concept of a congruity between one’s
character and one’s nature, and thus of the
live possibility of lacking congruity between
character and nature – of falling short of
one’s telos. Given this, the form of humor
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closely connected with the virtues would be
a representation of moral failures as
incongruities. To perceive such
incongruities in oneself and others would
be a mark of moral knowledge, and the
disposition to perceive them could be
counted as an important part of wisdom. In
so far as wisdom is a virtue which pervades
the others – there being wisdom concerning
justice, wisdom concerning truth-telling,
wisdom about situations calling for courage,
etc. – the moral sense of humor would
perhaps apply, with differences, to the
whole range of virtues (Roberts, p. 130).”
We see in Robert Roberts’ writing that a sense of
humor may be an aid to becoming a more virtuous
person, in other words, an aid in our moral
education.
Let us now turn from Robert Roberts to
Richard Richards. Richard Richards, like Robert
Roberts, contends that we possess a character and,
like Aristotle, holds character to be comprised of
attitudes and proclivities that we develop through
our choices and our actions. Like Robert Roberts,
Richard Richards is committed to a real reality and
among that which may be considered objective is
humor. It is an objective fact of the world if
something is humorous and those with a developed
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sense of humor will be the accomplished judges that
we can turn to in order to see whether an act was, in
fact, humorous.
So, what is it to have a sense of humor
according to Richard? In his words,
“A sense of humor is an attitude or set of
attitudes that involve a tendency to notice,
explore, and sometimes create
incongruities, and to appreciate them in a
playful way that is usually pleasurable
(Richards, p. 72).”
A sense of humor is thus, first and foremost, an
attitude or set of attitudes. What is an attitude?
“An attitude is a habitual psychological
structure that influences and often controls
what we perceive, that is, what we think
and feel, and the beliefs we have about
those things we perceive and feel. Though
the term ‘attitude’ has, in common usage,
come to mean mostly a bad or hostile
attitude, I am using the term much more
generally. Roughly, an attitude is a set of
habits with which we approach life, and
many attitudes are learned early in life
(Richards, pp. 72-3).”
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As with Robert Roberts, we see with Richard
Richards, a firm commitment to a practical
Aristotelianism.
A sense of humor for Richard is thus an
attitude. It is an attitude which leads to the
appreciation of incongruities. Let us take the notion
of incongruity to be well-understood and welldefined (ignoring Robert Latta’s objections here).
The question remaining is therefore, “What is it to
appreciate an incongruity?” Richard answers,
“The act of appreciating involves
recognizing the worth of something. It
involves the discovery or creation of value.
You have to have some sort of knowledge in
order to appreciate something. That also
distinguishes it from simple cases of liking.
You can like something without recognizing
its worth or value. You can value something
without liking it. The recognition of value or
worth involves the possession of some kind
of knowledge other than that involved in
liking (Richards, p. 76).”
Appreciating something, an incongruity or
otherwise, involves specialized knowledge which
some may possess and others not. In this way, we
see John Stuart Mill’s famous passage from
Utilitarianism being obliquely referred to in which
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there are some who have developed a proclivity that
makes them superior judges of value. “It is better to
be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied;
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different
opinion, it is only because they only know their own
side of the question. (Mill, p. 10).” In the same way,
if a person with a developed sense of humor finds
something funny and someone else does not, the
person without the developed sense of humor is
wrong about the objective fact of the humorousness
of the object.
The sense of humor as Richard Richards sets
it out does not require an objective human nature.
It is a desirable development in the character of a
person, but not a failure of character the way Robert
Roberts would have. As such, what we see in
Richard Richards’ conception of the human and the
sense of humor is something akin to Kant’s notion of
an imperfect duty. It is a good to develop it, but not
something morally necessary.
But its development is not direct.
According to Richard, the development of a sense of
humor requires first that one develop a sense of the
funny.
“The sense of the funny is a skill at
determining where a person is likely to find
the amusing, rather than simply waiting for
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something to happen which causes laughs.
It also includes a habitual understanding of
when it is appropriate to laugh and when it
is not (Richards, p. 77).”
As a child, one develops a sense of the funny, but
then as an adult one may go farther and develop a
full-fledged sense of humor.
“When does the sense of the funny become
the sense of humor? It varies in individual
cases. We hone the ability to laugh at the
proper times. From this proceeds the
ability to appreciate the incongruities of life.
It takes more learning for a person to have
a sense of humor than to learn to laugh
when others laugh, to laugh when someone
says something that is called ‘funny’ and we
feel obliged to laugh (Richards, p. 78).”
So, where Robert Roberts gives us an account of the
sense of humor that comes not only from a
commitment to a virtue ethics, but also a
commitment to the underlying metaphysical picture
of the human being, we can say that Robert Roberts
has an Aristotelian Aristotelianism. Richard
Richards, unlike Robert Roberts, does not have an
Aristotelian Aristotelianism. Richard Richards’
Aristotelianism is more intricate. He invokes the sort
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of levels of knowledge being morally relevant that
we find in Mill. He makes the sense of humor a
desirable property along the lines of the imperfect
duties of Kant. And he makes the development of it
a stepwise evolutionary process of the sort we find
in Hegel. Therefore, we can say that Richard has a
Kantian Hegelian Millian Aristotelianism.
I love the phrase “Kantian Hegelian Millian
Aristotelianism” because it might be a convoluted
way of saying something straightforward which
would make it quite Kantian. It might be a
convoluted way of saying absolutely nothing, which
would make it quite Hegelian. Or it might just lead
one to have a nervous breakdown which would
make it quite Millian.
I will mention the title of one of my favorite
papers in the philosophy of language at this point by
Nathan Salmon. His goal in this article is to revive
John Stuart Mill’s approach to language and is titled,
“How to be a Millian Heir.” I do not bring this up
because it has any relevance at all to the points I am
making here, but rather because this is my paper
and I will talk about whatever the fuck I want.
So, we have with Robert Roberts and
Richard Richards, two contrasting Aristotelian
accounts of the sense of humor. Robert Roberts is
an Aristotelian Aristotelian where Richard Richards is
not an Aristotelian Aristotelian, but rather a Kantian
Hegelian Millian Aristotelian.
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Which of the two ought we prefer? To
weigh the two alternatives with an eye toward
seeing which is stronger, I propose we look to
Richard Richards. Not Richard Richards – that would
be to engage in circular reasoning precisely because
the reasoning would be circular. Rather, Richard
Richards, by which I mean not Richard C. Richards,
the beloved member of the Lighthearted
Philosophers Society and emeritus philosopher of
aesthetics, ethics, and love and sex from Cal Poly,
Pomona, but rather Richard A. Richards, professor of
philosophy with a focus on the philosophy of biology
at the University of Alabama. (That’s the University
of Alabama not in Birmingham, but in Tuscaloosa,
real Alabama – Richard Richards from Alabama
Alabama). Richard A. Richards toured the world as a
professional, classical dancer before he became a
professional philosopher, completing his graduate
work at Johns Hopkins where we took graduate
seminars in philosophy of science together. I pride
myself on perhaps being the only person who is
friends with both Richard Richardses.
As one would expect from an expert on
evolutionary explanation, Richard Richards gives an
account of aesthetic judgment which is modeled
upon the Darwinian concept of fitness. Evolutionary
fitness, Richards argues, is a three-place relationship
among the property, the organism, and the context
in which the organism finds itself. It is the
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contextual piece that is essential here. No property
is itself good for an organism in general, but only
good in terms of its context. That context may be
internal – that is, advantageous in terms of the
relations of the parts of the organisms – or external
– that is, advantageous in relation to some
environmental factor. But whether it is an internal
or external context, we have to see fitness as a
function of its functional context. Fitness for Richard
Richards is a function of function.
Richard Richards’ own fitness, for example,
has been significantly aided by the contextual factor
of his avoiding gluten. He told me he dropped
fifteen pounds. Dude looked good last time I was
down in Alabama.
Just as with evolutionary fitness, so too with
artistic fitness. We have to see fitness as a threeplace relation connecting a property of the work
(e.g., unity, complexity, or intensity), the work as a
whole, and the context of the work. Again, the
functional context may be internal – that is, a
function of the property understood fully within the
work itself, such as color relationships, composition,
or form – or it may be external – that is, an aspect of
the social, historical, or political context in which the
artistic work is appreciated.
As a philosopher with a strong biological
background, he points out that a number of the
properties we judge positively in works of art are
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direct results of our cognitive structure which
directly results from our brains being the product of
evolutionary processes. The human brain, for
example, is outstanding at edge detection because
we naturally engage in lateral inhibition wherein the
brain naturally exaggerates the contrast in light
values when darker and lighter areas are juxtaposed.
This is why we will naturally project boundaries and
edges onto pieces like pointillist works in which none
exist.
As such, our appreciation of art – and we
can argue by extension, humor – is a function of our
function as humans. This is very much in line with
the sort of Aristotelian Aristotelianism of Robert
Roberts as it posits universal human properties
which we can see as the sort of human nature
Roberts requires.
But Richard Richards also contends that the
external context is crucial to understanding our
understanding of art. We acquire categories
through education and the more educated one is,
the better one is as a judge of artistic quality.
“The experience of an artwork will
therefore vary depending on which features
we believe to be standard, variable, and
contra-standard, and that depends on
experience and learning. Consequently,
functional context – and functioning – will
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vary depending on the presence of this kind
of knowledge in those who experience the
work (Richards, p. 267).”
Further, the acquired knowledge affects how we
perceive, not just how we interpret what we
perceive.
“Education can affect the experience of an
artwork in other ways. Experiments have
shown that formal training influences visual
scan paths in the scrutiny of the artwork
(ibid.).”
If we take humor to be an artistic category, then this
approach is precisely in line with the sort of Kantian
Hegelian Millian Aristotelianism espoused by Richard
Richards.
So, while Richard Richards may be seen at
first to side with Robert Roberts against Richard
Richards, in the end it does seem that Richard
Richards supports Richard Richards over Robert
Roberts. But he does not fully locate himself on
either extreme, instead contending that the correct
answer is to be found in the mean between two
extremes. So, while Richard Richards may not
espouse an Aristotelian Aristotelianism; Richard
Richards, on the other hand, can be thought of as
adopting an Aristotelian Aristotelian Aristotelianism.
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But Richard Richards’ Aristotelian Aristotelian
Aristotelianism does not support Robert Roberts’
Aristotelian Aristotelianism, rather Richard Richards’
Aristotelian Aristotelian Aristotelianism supports
Richard Richards’ Kantian Hegelian Millian
Aristotelianism. So, we must conclude that in this
case, we should agree with Richard. That is, Richard,
not Richard. But we agree with Richard because
Richard agrees with Richard.
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